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Abstract: Insurers typically argue that regulatory limits on their ability to use genetic tests will 
ȱ ȁȱȂǲȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱȱȱȱ
society as a whole. I argue that, even on its own terms, this argument is often flawed. From the 
viewpoint of society as a whole, not all adverse selection is adverse. Limits on genetic 
discrimination that induce the right amount of adverse selection (but not too much adverse selection) 
ȱȱȁȱȂǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ǯ 
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1. Introduction 
Public policy on genetics and insurance is typically perceived as a balancing act between two 
competing considerations. On the one hand, there are social, ethical and public health arguments, 
which suggest that the ability of insurers to decline particular customers or charge higher prices on 
the basis of predictive genetic tests should be severely limited. On the other hand, there are 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȱǰȂȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ
discrimination has costs, not just for insurers, but for society as a whole. Under this framing, public 
policy always involves a trade-off of two ills, genetic discrimination versus adverse selection: how 
much genetic discrimination can we tolerate, and what level of adverse selection costs are we 
prepared to pay? 
The main point of this article is that this trade-off is often illusory. From the viewpoint of society 
as a whole, not all adverse selection is adverse, and public policy should not aim to eliminate all 
adverse selection. Limits on insurance discrimination, which induce the right amount of adverse 
ȱǻȱȱȱȱȱǼȱȱȱȁȱȂǰȱȱȱȱȱ
work better for society as a whole. My argument is one of simple arithmetic, which is demonstrated 
in this paper by simple examples. For a more discursive treatment, see the recent book Thomas 
(2017), and for technical details see the papers (Thomas 2008; Hao et al. 2016a, 2016b, 2018). 
ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȁȱ
Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ext of genetics and insurance. Start with the observation that, if permitted, 
insurers will seek to obtain the results of any genetic tests which insurance applicants may have 
taken, and then charge applicants low or high prices depending on their individual results. If instead 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱȁȂǼȱȱȱ
all applicants, they might initially set the price as a population-weighted average of the high and low 
risk prices. This pooled price will seem expensive to low risks, and cheap to high risks; and so (the 
argument goes) low risks will have lower propensity to buy insurance, and high risks will have 
higher propensity. Compared to the whole population, the pool of insurance purchasers will be 
skewed towards higher risks. To avoid losses, insurers will then need to reset the pooled price higher 
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than a population-weighted average of the high and low risk prices. In addition, since low risks are 
usually more numerous than high risks, reduced purchasing propensity by low risks combined with 
increased purchasing propensity by high risks implies that the total number of risks insured will 
usually fall. This triad of phenomenaȯinsurance purchasing skewed towards higher risks, higher 
insurance prices, and reduced numbers insuredȯ¢ȱȱȁȱȂǯȱ  
ȱȱȱ¢ȱȁȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ
disadvantageous to the insurance company (but only if it failed to reflect this skew in the price set). 
However, insurers (and also most economists) go further: they say that adverse selection is also 
adverse to society as a whole. This view starts from an intuitive premise that the compensation of 
ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȁȱȂȱǻȱȱ ȱȱǼǯȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ
the higher insurance prices and reduction in numbers insured implied by adverse selection 
represent a bad outcome for society as a whole. 
However, in a competitive market, the higher insurance price under adverse selection is 
matched by higher claim payouts; there is no loss to society as a whole. Furthermore, the reduction in 
numbers insured under adverse selection is not equivalent to a reduction in losses compensated. Losses 
compensated depend not just on numbers insured, but on which people are insured: the low risks 
(who arguably need insurance less), or the high risks (who arguably need insurance more). This 
distinction about which people are insured under adverse selection leads to a novel insight: if the 
shift in coverage towards higher risks is large enough, it might more than outweigh the fall in 
numbers insured. The expected quantum of losses compensated by insuranceȯȱ¢ȱȱȱȁȱ
Ȃȯmight then be increased by adverse selection.  
In cases where the shift in coverage towards higher risks more than outweighs the fall in 
numbers insured, adverse selection implies that more risks are voluntarily transferred to insurers, 
and more losses are compensated. In this scenario, I argue that adverse selection is not adverse at all; 
on the contrary, it represents a better outcome for society as a whole.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I give simple examples that illustrate 
how the shift in coverage towards higher risk under adverse selection might more than outweigh the 
fall in numbers insured (and also how it might not). In Section 3, I discuss the broader application of 
these examples, and give some empirical evidence. Section 4 discusses some considerations which 
the simple examples leave out. Section 5 gives conclusions. 
2. Simple Examples of Adverse Selection 
This section elaborates on the argument sketched in Section 1 that some adverse selection (but 
not too much adverse selection) can be a good thing for society as a whole. The method is illustration 
by examples, in the same spirit as dice-rolling examples to illustrate probability laws. The examples 
are simplified and exaggerated for clarity, but the underlying point is quite general. 
In life or health insurance in the context of genetics, the usual population pattern we observe is 
¢ȱȱȁȂȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱ
test result indicating a predisposition to illness). To represent this, consider a population of just ten 
people, comprising eight lower risks and two higher risks. Assume that all losses and insurance 
cover are for unit amounts (this simplifies the discussion, but it is not necessary). Then, consider 
three alternative scenarios for insurance risk classification and adverse selection. 
The first scenarioȯrisk-differentiated premiums, with no adverse selectionȯis represented in 
ȱŗǯȱ ȱ ȱȁȂȱȱȱ  ȱǰȱȱȱȁ
Ȃȱȱȱȱȱǻ¢ȱ ȱȱ
genetic predisposition to illness). The lower risk-group of eight risks each have probability of loss 
0.01, and the higher risk-group of two risks each have probability of loss 0.04. 
In Scenario 1, members of each risk-group are charged a risk-differentiated price equal to their 
true probability of loss. The response of each risk-group to a risk-differentiated price is the same: 
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exactly half the members of each risk-group buy insurance.1 The shading over five risks represents 
that those five risks buy insurance. 
 
Figure 1. Scenario 1: risk-differentiated premiums. 
The weighted average of the premiums paid is (4 × 0.01 +1 × 0.04)/5 = 0.016. Since higher and 














u  u  u  u  (1) 
Now consider Scenario 2 in Figure 2. Risk classification has been banned, and so insurers have 
to charge a common pooled premium to both higher and lower risks. Higher risks buy more 
insurance, and lower risks buy less (this is adverse selection). The pooled premium is set as the 
weighted average of the true risks, so that expected profits on low risks exactly offset expected losses 
on high risks. This weighted average premium is (1 × 0.01 +2 × 0.04)/3 = 0.03. The shading symbolises 
that three risks (compared with five previously) buy insurance. 
 
Figure 2. Scenario 2: pooled premiums (with some adverse selection). 
Note that, in Scenario 2, purchasing is skewed towards higher risks, the weighted average 
premium is higher, and the number of risks insured is lower. This triad comprises the essential 
features of adverse selection, which Scenario 2 accurately and completely represents. However, 
there is a surprise: despite the adverse selection in Scenario 2, the expected losses compensated by 
                                                     
1 This 50% take-up assumption is broadly representative of extant life insurance markets, in which risk 
classification is largely unrestricted. The Life Insurance Market Research Organisation (2016) states that 44% 
of US households have some individual life insurance. The Association of British Insurers (2016) states that 
9.2 m of 26.7 m (i.e., 35%) of households in the UK in 2012 had some form of life insurance. 
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insurance for the wȱȱȱ ȱǯȱȱǰȱśŜƖȱȱȱȂȱ¡ȱȱ
are now compensated by insurance, compared with 50% before. The calculation is:  
 
 










u  u  u  u  (2) 
Scenario 2, with a higher expecȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ
insuranceȯhigher loss coverageȯseems superior from a social viewpoint to Scenario 1. The 
superiority of Scenario 2 arises not despite adverse selection, but because of adverse selection. 
A ban on risk classification can also reduce loss coverage, if the adverse selection which the ban 
induces becomes too severe. This possibility is illustrated in Scenario 3 in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. Scenario 3: pooled premiums (with severe adverse selection). 
In Figure 3, adverse selection has progressed to the point where only one higher risk, and no 
lower risks, buys insurance. The expected losses compensated by insurance for the whole 
ȱȱ ȱ ǯȱȱǰȱŘśƖȱȱȱȂȱ¡ȱȱȱ ȱompensated by 









u  u  u  (3) 
Taken together, the three scenarios suggest that banning risk classification can increase loss 
ȱȱȱȱȱȽȱȂȱȱȱȱǻȱŘǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ ȱ ȽȱȂȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ řǼǯȱȱ ȱ Řȱ ȱ ȱ řȱ ¢ȱ
prevails depends on the response of higher and lower risks to changes in pricesȯthat is, the 
ȁȱȂȱȱȱȱ ȱǯ 
3. Discussion 
3.1. Discussion of Examples  
The argument illustrated by the examples applies broadly. It does not depend on the specific 
context of life insurance, nor on any unusual choice of numbers for the examples. The key idea is that 
loss coverageȯexpected losses compensated by insurance for the whole populationȯis increased by 
a degree of adverse selection. 
I argue that, for a public policymaker or regulator, loss coverage is a good metric for the social 
¢ȱȱǯȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ
purpose of insurance, which policymakers often seek to promoteȯby public education, by 
exhortation and sometimes by incentives such as tax relief on premiums. Policymakers may 
therefore prefer risk classification regimes that lead to higher loss coverage. This typically means 
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regimes with some restrictions on risk classification, leading to some degree of adverse selection, 
and somewhat lower numbers insured than if adverse selection were eliminated. 
My argument contrasts with orthodox economic arguments that public policymakers should 
either seek to minimise adverse selection, or make a trade-off against other policy preferences such 
as an ethical aversion to genetic discrimination. The orthodox arguments highlight that adverse 
selection leads to a rise in the average price of insurance and fall in numbers insured. What these 
arguments overlook is that adverse selection also leads to a shift in coverage towards higher risks 
(those who need insurance most). If this shift in coverage is large enough, it can more than outweigh 
the fall in numbers insured, so that loss coverage is increased. 
One way to maximise loss coverage is to make insurance compulsory. Public policymakers 
sometimes adopt this solution (e.g., third-party liability insurance in many jurisdictions for road 
vehicles, or social insurance for risks such as unemployment). In other markets (e.g., life insurance), 
loss coverage is socially important, but arguably not enough to justify the infringement of freedom 
which compulsory insurance implies. In these markets, public policymakers may seek to raise loss 
coverage to the maximum level consistent with individual freedom of choice in insurance decisions. 
ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȁȂȱȱ
of adverse selectionȯthe level which maximises loss coverage. 
3.2. Comparison with Empirical Demand Elasticities  
Which of Scenario 2 (good) or Scenario 3 (bad) in Section 2 above will actually prevail if we 
restrict risk classification, say by banning use of genetic tests to set prices? This depends on the 
response of higher and lower risks to changes in the prices they faceȯthat is, the demand elasticities 
of higher and lower risks. Generally speaking, it is helpful (in the sense of promoting Scenario 2) if 
two conditions are satisfied, First, lower risks should have lower elasticity (lower responsiveness to 
price), and higher risks should have higher elasticity (higher responsiveness to price). This 
combination implies that, when differentiation of prices by risk is restricted, low risks (who face a 
higher price than before) will tend to remain in the market, and high risks (who face a lower price 
than before) will tend to join the market, thus increasing loss coverage overall. Second, it is helpful if 
all demand elasticities have absolute value less than one; in other words, a given percentage rise in 
price causes a smaller percentage fall in demand (e.g., if price increases say 10%, demand falls only 
5%).2  
There is a good deal of evidence that insurance demand elasticities are indeed often of absolute 
value less than 1. Table 1 shows some relevant empirical estimates for insurance demand elasticities. 
Whilst the various contexts in which the estimates were made do not correspond exactly to the 
scenarios I use in Section 2 above, the figures are at least suggestive of the possibility that the 
ȱȁȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȄȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǯǯȱ  
4. Some Considerations Which the Examples in Section 2 Leave Out  
The possibility illustrated in Section 2 that a degree of adverse selection increases loss coverage 
is quite general, but it may seem surprising in the light of traditional negative perceptions of adverse 
selection. The present section discusses a number of considerations which were omitted in Section 2, 
and shows that they do not fundamentally change the validity of my main point. 
4.1. Insurer Expenses and Profits  
The examples abstract from all the loadings which insurers add to pure risk premiums to cover 
expenses and profits. Including the loadings makes the results more complicated, but without 
changing the main insight that some adverse selection (and hence some restriction on risk 
classification) is needed to maximise loss coverage.  
                                                     
2 The mathematical justification for these statements is developed in (Hao et al. 2018). 
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Table 1. Estimates of demand elasticity for various insurance markets. 




Yearly renewable term life insurance, USA ƺŖǯŚȱȱƺŖǯś Pauly et al. (2003) 
Term life insurance, USA ƺŖǯŜŜ Viswanathan et al. (2007) 
Whole life insurance, USA ƺŖǯŝŗȱȱƺŖǯşŘ Babbel (1985) 
Health insurance, USA ŖȱȱƺŖǯŘ 
Chernew et al. (1997);  
Blumberg et al. (2001); 
Buchmueller and Ohri (2006) 
Health insurance, Australia ƺŖǯřśȱȱƺŖǯśŖ Butler (1999) 
Farm crop insurance, USA ƺŖǯřŘȱȱƺŖǯŝř Goodwin (1993) 
Note: Demand elasticities are all given with a minus sign because a rise in price implies a fall in demand. 
4.2. Adverse Selection Involving Unusually Large Insurance Policies  
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȁȱ
ȂǼȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ǰ 
but also the selective choice of a larger sum insured.  This may be a serious concern if insurance can 
be bought in circumstances where a claim is more likely than not (e.g., life insurance when the 
purchaser has already been diagnosed with a terminal illness); in these circumstances, choosing a 
large sum insured (and paying the correspondingly large premium) may represent a very attractive 
investment opportunity. However, in circumstances where a genetic test result implies that a claim 
is more probable, but still unlikely, the perception that a customer can exploit any under-pricing by 
choosing a larger sum insured is often exaggerated by many commentators. 
To understand this exaggeration, suppose that an insurer offers a life insurance premium based 
on an assumed risk of dying of p = 5% over the term of an insurance policy (say the next 25 years), 
but I have private information (e.g. a genetic test result), which indicates that my real risk is four 
times the normal level, which is pȘȱƽȱŘŖƖǯȱȱȱȁȂȱin over-insurance, then my private knowledge 
ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȁȂȱȱǻśƖȱȱȱŘŖƖǼǯȱ
 ǰȱȱȱȁȂȱǰȱ
it is still very likely (80% likely, with the true probabilities) that I will just pay all the premiums and 
not die in the term, so that no payout is made.  
This one-shot gamble against long odds seems to me an unattractive investment proposition for 
the customer for a large bet. It would remain unattractive for a wide range of plausible probabilities 
and premiumsǯȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȁȂȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ for insurance purposes, such as 
ensuring dependents have an adequate income in the unlikely event of my early death. However, 
the notion that over-insurance based on a private genetic test is a no-brainer for investment purposes is 
not mathematically valid, if the loss event remains unlikely on the true probabilities.3  
4.3. Insurance as Probabilistic Good versus Reassurance Good 
Loss coverage was defined above as expected losses compensated by insurance. Another way of 
characterising loss coverage is that it represents the coverage of insurance, weighted by the risks of 
those who are coveredȯthat is, loss coverage is risk-weighted coverage. 
The risk-weighted nature of loss coverage is predicated on the notion that the good provided by 
insurance is the contingent compensation of losses. This good materialises only in a particular future 
state of the world, which has different probabilities for higher and lower risks. That is, insurance is a 
probabilistic and individually heterogeneous good. For such a good, one unit of sales to a higher risk 
                                                     
3 A fuller mathematical discussion of the point made here is given in Chapter 11 of (Thomas 2017). 
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individual is a different (more valuable) good compared with one unit of sales to a lower risk 
individual. In loss coverage, this difference is reflected in the risk-weighting of coverage.  
This framing of insurance as a probabilistic good is implicit in most commentary on risk 
classification, and it seems appropriate when considering public policy at a population and objective 
level. However, at an individual and subjective level, insurance can also be framed as a 
non-ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱ ȱ ¢Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȁȱȱ
 ¢Ȃȱ ȱȱ-probabilistic good. In the specific insurance context, we might call it a reassurance 
good.  
If insurance is framed as a reassurance good, is it still more valuable for higher risks in 
proportion to their risk (as the definition of loss coverage implies)? I would argue yes: four times the 
risk means four times the worry.  However, another argument is that the value of reassurance 
provided by a particular class of insurance (say life insurance) is broadly the same for all customers, 
and largely invariant to individual variations in probabilities of loss. If the latter argument is 
favoured, then the risk-weighted nature of loss coverage may overstate the benefits of covering higher 
risks.  
4.4. Other Rationales for Restrictions on Insurance Risk Classification  
Restrictions on risk classification may be justified by concerns quite different from the 
aggregate insurance market outcomes, which are the focus of this paper. These concerns may 
include perceptions of unfairness, inaccuracy, prejudice, pre-existing disadvantage, controllability, 
transparency, consent, and perverse incentives (e.g., not to undergo clinically useful tests because of 
worry about insurance consequences). These concerns do not in any way detract from the main 
point of this paper; they provide additional reasons for considering some restrictions on risk 
classification.4  
ŚǯśǯȱȱǱȱȱȂȱ 
Whilst this paper focuses mainly on a public policy perspective, the loss coverage concept can 
ȱȱ ȱȱȱȂȱerspective. Maximising loss coverage is equivalent to maximising 
Ȃȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ¡ȱ ȱ
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ǰȱ
adverse selection is not always a bad thing. 
5. Conclusions 
Public policy on genetics and insurance is typically perceived as a balancing act between two 
competing considerations. On the one hand, there are social, ethical and public health arguments, 
which suggest that the ability of insurers to discriminate on the basis of predictive genetic tests 
ȱȱ ǯȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȁȱ
Ȃǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱs costs, not just for insurers, but 
for society as a whole. I argue that this trade-off is often illusory. From the viewpoint of society as a 
whole, not all adverse selection is adverse; public policy should not aim to eliminate all adverse 
selection. Limits on insurance discrimination that induce the right amount of adverse selection (but 
not too much adverse selection) can increase the expected losses compensate by insuranceȯthat is, 
ȱȁȱȂȯand so make insurance work better. 
The right amount of restriction depends on the response of higher and lower risks to changes in 
the prices they face, that is the demand elasticities of higher and lower risks. Some restrictions on 
genetic tests may well be helpful in inducing the right amount of adverse selection (that is, the level 
                                                     
4 Thomas (2012) and Chapter 7 of Thomas (2017) give a fuller discussion of other rationales. 
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so induce too much adverse selection and lower loss coverage. 
The argument of this article is distinct from deontological arguments that it is morally wrong 
for insurers to discriminate on the basis of genetic tests, or consequentialist arguments that such 
discrimination will deter people from seeking clinically useful tests, or lead to stigmatisation 
affecting employment and other relations. These wider arguments may have merit. However, the 
argument in this article is based solely on aggregate insurance market outcomes; it is a matter of 
arithmetic, not of ethics. 
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